Can we learn from SCADA security Incidents? by Tryfonas, Theo & May, John H R
                          Tryfonas, T., & May, J. H. R. (2013). Can we learn from SCADA security
Incidents? European Network and Information Security Agency.
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via ENISA at
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/critical-infrastructure-and-services/scada-industrial-
control-systems/can-we-learn-from-scada-security-incidents. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the
publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Can we learn from SCADA security incidents? 
 
 
 October 2013 
 
Page  1 
 
www.enisa.europa.eu 
 Technical background: ICS and SCADA 
Industrial systems and critical infrastructures are often 
monitored and controlled by simple computers called 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS). ICS are based on standard 
embedded systems platforms and they often use commercial 
off-the-self software. ICS are used to control industrial 
processes such as manufacturing, product handling, 
production, and distribution. Well-known types of ICS include 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
distributed control systems (DCS), and programmable logic 
controllers (PLC).  
SCADA systems historically distinguish themselves from other 
ICS by being the largest subgroup of ICS systems and large 
scale processes that can include multiple sites and large 
distances. A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
system can be typically viewed as an assembly of 
interconnected equipment used to monitor and control 
physical equipment in industrial environments. They are widely 
used to automate geographically distributed processes such as 
electricity power generation, transmission and distribution, Oil 
and gas refining and pipeline management, water treatment 
and distribution, chemical production and processing, rail 
systems and other mass transit. 
 
Can we learn from SCADA security incidents? 
1 Introduction  
Security experts across the world continue to sound the alarm bells about the security of Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS).1 Industrial Control Systems look more and more like consumer PCs. They are 
used everywhere and involve a considerable amount of software, often outdated and unpatched. 
Recent security incidents in the context of SCADA and Industrial Control Systems emphasise greatly 
the importance of good governance and control of SCADA infrastructures.2 In particular the ability to 
respond to critical incidents and be able to analyse and learn from what happened is crucial. 
The EU recognized the urgency of this 
problem and the recently proposed cyber 
security strategy for the EU is focussing on 
improving the security of network and 
information systems used for critical 
infrastructures 3 . The strategy calls EU 
member states, the industry, and ENISA to 
increase the level of NIS in critical sectors, 
and to support exchange of best-practices. 
ENISA responded to this call by launching 
several activities on security of ICS and 
SCADA4. 
Network level monitoring comprises mature 
technologies that have been used 
successfully for analysing security incidents 
in traditional networking environments for 
many years. Deployment of intrusion 
detection sensors and traffic logging 
becomes more acceptable practice, 
especially as a lot of contemporary systems 
are IP-enabled. Increasingly more relevant advisory bodies issue guidelines and standards that are 
applicable to the domain of security of this type of environments. 
This white paper explores the concerns mentioned above and provides recommendations for the 
implementation of a proactive environment that will facilitate agile and integrated response to 
incidents and their ex-post analysis. 
ENISA identified several key activities that can contribute to this goal: 
 Facilitating the integration of cyber and physical response processes with a greater 
understanding of where digital evidence may be found and what would be the appropriate 
actions to preserve it; 
                                                          
1
 http://threatpost.com/hackers-aggressively-scanning-ics-scada-default-credentials-vulnerabilities 
2
 http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/10000-control-systems-online/ 
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/eu-cybersecurity-plan-protect-open-internet-and-online-freedom-and-opportunity-cyber-
security 
4
 http://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/programmes-reports/work-programme-2013 
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 Designing and configuring systems in a way that enables digital evidence retention,  
 Complementing the existing skills base with ex post analysis expertise and understanding 
overlaps between cyber and physical critical incident response teams,  
 Increasing inter-organisational public and privately held and cross-country collaboration 
efforts. 
2 Target audience 
The goals of this white paper are to inform the related community of SCADA operators and security 
engineers and to provide another interface between policy makers and technology specialists in the 
sensitive domain of critical infrastructure protection. 
 In particular, ENISA aims at: 
 Informing operational teams about the logging and ex post incident analysis capabilities that 
they should consider when designing and implementing  ICS systems, based on the current 
level of the threat existing in their operating context, 
 Informing security engineers about the opportunities and the challenges that this largely 
proprietary domain can pose, 
 Proposing a set of recommendations for developing a proactive environment of an 
appropriate level of preparedness with respect to ex post incident analysis and learning 
capability 
 Facilitating further debates between the first two groups of stakeholders and policy makers in 
their struggles to facilitate the development and maintenance of secure and resilient critical 
infrastructures. 
3 Ex post incident analysis 
The primary goal of an ex post incident analysis is to obtain valuable information regarding security 
incidents in order to form an in-depth knowledge of what happened. By examining the various parts 
of the system, valuable knowledge can be obtained. However, it is not only important for the 
understanding of the circumstances under which a security incident occurred but it also gives the 
ability to: 
 Create a body of robust evidence in order to respond to the changing nature of domestic and 
alien threats, minimize the outages of ICS-SCADA systems5, 
 Ensure that enough learning takes place in order to deploy resilient systems. 
Collecting evidence related to incidents can reveal the actions that took place during the incident 
along with the incentives and perhaps the identity of the attacker. 
There exist many places in a networked system where evidence can be recovered. Network traffic 
and operating system (OS) log files form the most significant sources of evidence; however the 
diverse nature of industrial control systems hinders the usage of a single, consistent methodology. 
Ex post incident analysis forms a fundamental part of security management. Although it is the first 
stage of digital forensic process, one should distinguish these two terms because a digital forensic 
                                                          
5 By investigating a security incident, valuable knowledge can be gained which can be used to strengthen the system against future attacks 
and mitigate the effects of such incidents by incorporating the appropriate proactive defence mechanisms.  
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analysis involves the preparation of results so as to allow them to be presented as evidence to a 
court of law and engagement with legal enforcement authorities is mandatory, while an ex post 
incident analysis aims primarily at: 
 Identifying the target of an attack, 
 Inferring the attacker’s actual goal if possible, 
 Identifying the vulnerabilities of the system on which the attack was based,  
 Discovering a possible data theft and traces that can be used to unveil the source of the 
attack. 
3.1 The process 
The first steps of incident analysis in the domain of industrial control systems involve the 
examination of the system and the identification of the impacted components. Next, all OS logs and 
transaction logs relative to these components are gathered and analysed based on well-known 
guidelines that are widely available67. 
There are five basic steps when it comes to performing an ex post incident analysis of any device89 as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig 1. Ex post incident analysis process in SCADA systems. 
These steps are: 
1. Examination: In the examination phase the investigator has to understand all the potential 
sources of evidence in a SCADA system. In addition, any other system related to the SCADA 
system under investigation also needs to be taken into account. This includes access 
terminals, logging servers and routers. 
 
                                                          
6
 S. Wilkinson, “Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence,” Assoc. Chief Police Off., 2010. 
7
 M. Fabro and E. Cornelius, “Recommended Practice: Creating Cyber Forensics Plans for Control Systems,” Dep. Homel. Secur., 2008. 
8
 R. Radvanovsky and J. Brodsky, Eds., Handbook of SCADA/Control Systems Security. CRC Press, 2013. 
9
 T. Spyridopoulos and V. Katos, “Requirements for a Forensically Ready Cloud Storage Service,” Int. J. Digit. Crime Forensics Ijdcf, vol. 3, 
no. 3, pp. 19–36, 2011. 
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2. Identification of evidence: The starting point of this stage is the identification of the type of 
system under investigation10. Once the type of system has become known, the next step is 
to identify the operating system of the system that is used, the types and manufacture of 
the PLCs, and the network design and implementation. Towards this direction information 
gathered from the system’s Point of Contact (POC) can provide valuable data. The 
manufacturer’s documentation, the design specifications, network diagrams and the Human 
Machine Interface (HMI) itself can assist the identification process. 
3. Collection of evidence: The collection phase involves the collection of data from all the 
systems with memory components that have been identified in step 2. Network traffic 
between the identified system’s components, such as network traffic between the control 
network and the management network, and between the SCADA system and the Internet 
should also be captured. 
4. Analysis of evidence: In the analysis phase evidence is identified in the data collected. 
Eventually, a timeline of activities based on the data that was gathered in the collection 
phase is created. The major categories of ex post incident analysis can be defined using the 
notion of abstraction layers11. 
 Physical Media Analysis: The analysis of the physical media translates the contents of 
a storage layout to a standard interface (e.g. IDE or SCSIs). Examples include a hard 
disk, compact flash, and memory chips. 
 Media Management Analysis: In the analysis of media management, evidence 
sources are organized based on certain criteria linked to data structures. Examples of 
this activity include dividing a hard disk into partitions, organising multiple disks into a 
volume, and integrating multiple memory chips into memory space. 
 File System Analysis: The analysis of the file system layer of abstraction, which 
translates the bytes and sectors of the partition to directories and files, involves 
viewing directories and file content leading to the recovery of deleted files. 
 Application Analysis: Analysis in this layer includes viewing log files, configuration 
files, images, documents and reverse engineering executable. The input data will 
typically come from the file system, but applications such as databases may read 
directly from the disk. 
 Network Analysis: Analysis in this layer includes managing network packets and IDS 
alerts. Analysis of logs generated by network services, a firewall or web server for 
instance, falls under the Network Analysis. 
                                                          
10
 The type of the system can be RTU, PLC, HMI, etc and final scope is to find the proper tools that can be used, based on the hardware 
and software specifications. 
11
 B. Carrier, “Defining digital forensic examination and analysis tools using abstraction layers,” Int. J. Digit. Evid., vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 1–12, 
2003. 
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 Memory Analysis: Analysis in this area includes identifying the code that a process 
was running and extracting sensitive data that was stored in this code. 
5. Documentation of the process and results: In every ex post analysis process, it is imperative 
to maintain comprehensive documentation. Detailed notes have to be kept with records of 
time, date, and the person responsible plus other essential information. This way it helps 
that no evidence has been tampered with by someone from inside during the ex post 
analysis and in the case of future incidents the documentation will be a baseline for the 
handling. 
3.2 Organisational structures and procedures  
For the above capabilities to be enabled within an organisation the appropriate structure and 
processes have to be in place with respect to incident responding and ex post analysis and 
investigation. Traditionally, an ex-post incident analysis program will be initiated after mitigation of 
incident and restoration of systems have been finalised by the existing incident response capability. 
Setting up an incident response capability is not trivial but there exist many resources describing the 
essential functions and organisational roles with their responsibilities.12  
Incident response operations are important because, if they are badly designed, they have the 
potential to hinder any follow on ex post investigation effort, as vital evidence may have been 
removed or otherwise affected during mitigation, recovery and restoration activities. However, if 
planned well, integrating ex post analysis capability within incident response procedures may work, 
with the investigative function being a contained aspect of the incident response capability, up to 
and including any submission of data for prosecution purposes. 
The core components of cyber incident response with an embedded investigative component would 
be modified as follows: 
1. Detection 
2. Response Initiation 
3. Incident Response Action/Evidence Collection 
4. Incident Recovery/Evidence Analysis 
5. Incident Closure/Process Reporting 
Due to the uniqueness of the data and the relationships amongst the information resources in the 
control systems domain, a team comprised of individuals that have an advanced understanding of 
the system should complete an analysis of collected evidence. 
Therefore, besides the traditional incident responders, the team members would need to include 
roles and responsibilities such as13: 
 Control Systems Incident Manager (CSIM) – a person with oversight of the responding 
operations in the control systems (CS) domain. They will have oversight of the activity 
ensuring liaisons with operations and IT personnel and ensure that requirements from both 
domains can be communicated in a manner that is understandable to all parties. 
 Control Systems Security Specialist (CSSS) – involved in ascertaining what critical assets may 
have been impacted. The CSSS will also work closely with both engineers and incident 
                                                          
12
 “CPNI Good Practice Guide, PROCESS CONTROL AND SCADA SECURITY GUIDE 3. ESTABLISH RESPONSE CAPABILITIES.” 
13
 M. Fabro and E. Cornelius, “Recommended Practice: Creating Cyber Forensics Plans for Control Systems,” Dep. Homel. Secur., 2008. 
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managers supporting both investigation and containment activities, and will have specific 
tactical activities supporting restoration, reporting, and analysis.  
 Control Systems Engineering Support (CSES) – Being able to have someone from the control 
systems engineering support contributing to primary functions such as containment, recovery 
planning, and restoration (as well as system upgrade), will provide significant value to the ex 
post analysis. 
 
Table 1. Roles matrix for incident response and analysis in control systems14. 
Incident Response 
Activity 
Incident 
Handling 
Team 
IR Coordinator 
(with CS) 
Primary 
Security 
(POC) 
Incident 
Response 
Director 
CS Incident 
Manager 
CS Security 
Specialist 
CS 
Engineering 
Support 
(CS Vendor 
Coordinator) 
Detection 
Detection P S P      
Initial Reporting 
and 
Documentation 
P P P      
Response Initiation 
Incident 
Classification 
P  P S P    
Escalation   P P P S   
Emergency Action P  P P  S S P 
Incident Response/ Evidence Collection 
Mobilization S P S P P S S S 
Investigation S P P S P P S S 
Containment P P S S P P P S 
Incident Recovery/Evidence Analysis 
Recovery 
Planning 
 S S S P P P S/P 
Restoration  S S S P P P S 
System Upgrade  S S S P P P S 
Incident Closure/ Process Reporting 
Summary Report  P S S S P S  
Mitigations/ 
Reporting 
  P P P P S S 
System Upgrade P  P P P P S  
Illustrated above as P are primary activities; and S – secondary functions. 
                                                          
14
 M. Fabro and E. Cornelius, “Recommended Practice: Creating Cyber Forensics Plans for Control Systems,” Dep. Homel. Secur., 2008. 
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3.3 The evidence and its integrity dimension 
To ensure the analyst has a concise and effective framework for executing a post mortem analysis in 
a control systems environment, the following traditional elements have to be examined15: 
 Reference clock system16: Many SCADA systems, due to the nature of the processes that they 
run, require activities and transactions to be accomplished within milliseconds. Taking also 
into account the volatility of evidence in a control system, the analyst needs clock reference of 
high precision in order to carry out the ex post analysis. Time stamping and recording activities 
during the investigation requires a high precision reference clock. 
 Activity logs and transaction logs: Depending on the nature of a SCADA system different data 
can be extracted from its various components during an ex post analysis. 
 
Table 2. Types of data that can be extracted from the components of a SCADA system, based on the 
underlying control technology and the acquisition tools used. 
 Control Centre Field Devices 
Modern/Common 
Control Systems 
Technologies 
- Network traffic capture. 
- Contact system administrator in case of 
modified OS on HMIs. 
- Network logs. 
- Control centre’s logs regarding field devices. 
 Device is off: Examination of device for 
possible evidence. 
 Device is on:  
Date and time, current active processes 
and current running processes. 
Modern/Proprietary 
Control Systems 
Technologies 
- Contemporary ex post incident analysis 
tools may be applicable. 
- Network traffic capture. 
- Interaction between the investigator 
and the vendor is mandatory. 
- Network logs. 
- Control centre’s logs regarding field devices. 
- Interaction between the investigator and the 
vendor is mandatory. 
- May involve embedded vendor-specific 
security mechanisms. 
Legacy/Proprietary 
Control Systems 
Technologies 
- Traditional post-mortem analysis 
methods cannot be applied. 
- No logging functionality. 
- No longer supported by the vendor. 
- Interaction with the owner of the 
equipment may provide some 
information. 
- Serial-based communications; network 
traffic cannot be captured. 
- Serial-based communication; network traffic 
cannot be captured. 
- Rapid rate of sampling and data override 
- Rapid rate of sampling and data override. 
- Interaction with the vendor is imperative. 
- An experienced engineer should be made 
available to support the investigation 
 
 Other sources of data: Other sources of data that should be involved in an ex post incident 
analysis include the various storage devices that can be found in the control centre of a 
SCADA system. These devices include removable media such as floppy discs, CDs/DVDs, USB 
                                                          
15
 M. Fabro and E. Cornelius, “Recommended Practice: Creating Cyber Forensics Plans for Control Systems,” Dep. Homel. Secur., 2008. 
16 When conducting an ex post incident analysis establishing a time reference is of vital importance for the normal progress of the 
investigation. In control systems, time synchronisation plays a major role not only for the incident investigation but also for the normal 
system’s operation. 
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Post incident investigation: When non-volatile data, such 
as data stored on a hard drive, are collected from a turned 
off system then the procedure falls into the category of 
post incident investigation. 
Live investigation: When volatile data need to be 
collected, such as memory dumps or network activity, 
then the process falls into the category of live 
investigation. 
 
devices or any other form of removable storage media that can be found in the premises of 
the control centre. 
 General system failures 
 Real time monitoring 
 Device integrity monitoring 
The documentation process also includes the generation of a detailed Summary Report that 
describes the entire process. This report has to include the state and status of the captured system 
throughout the collection process. Below we are focussing on the first three aspects, as the last 
three are issues that are traditionally well understood within the context of operations in SCADA 
systems, due to the emphasis on fault management, safety and reliability reporting. 
4 Challenges  
The high volatility of their data, the limited logging mechanisms that they may use and other 
characteristics of SCADA systems pose many challenges in the process of data collection and 
analysis, both from the technical and the operational perspectives. This section describes the 
challenges that may arise during a post mortem incident analysis in SCADA systems: 
 
A. Challenges of data collection: 
 
 Inadequate logging mechanisms: Logging mechanisms in SCADA systems are geared toward 
process disturbances rather than security breaches offering thus limited contribution in the 
incident response field, 
 
 High volatility of data: The nature of 
control systems imposes the 
deletion, removal or replacement of 
data in some components of the 
system, such as high-speed data 
recorders, in such a rate that it is 
practically unviable or impossible to 
collect them. The cost of logging 
mechanisms in such devices can be 
prohibitively high, 
 
 Customised operating system kernels: A SCADA system may utilise customised kernels 
running on its components in order to enhance the performance of the system, despite the 
fact that updating such kernels is difficult. This can render traditional data acquisition tools 
such as DD or memdump unable to run due to incompatibility issues or missing kernel 
modules. 
 
 Extensive lower data: Gathering information on lower levels of a SCADA network, such as 
data produced by sensors, would lead to vast amounts of information that require huge 
amount of storage. 
 
 Low computational power: Legacy systems have very little computational power for the 
recording and analysis of data that is produced in conjunction with control data. Therefore, 
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at this level no further operations can be implemented regarding other processes like 
incident analysis. 
 
B. Challenges of data analysis: 
  
 Ex post analysis tools: Contemporary tools for ex post analysis rely on precompiled scripts 
and programs that automate the evidence collection process by utilising certain techniques, 
such as bit copy processes and checksum generators that may not be applied in platforms 
and software elements of a control system in their native form so that afterwards analysis 
can be done. Software modifications need to be implemented in traditional analysis tools in 
order to meet the specifications of a control system.  
 
 Data analytics and correlation: Data gathered from key data repositories (such as Data 
Historians and HMIs) and volatile non-persistent data collected from the various field 
devices (such as PLCs and I/O devices) need to be correlated in order to create an 
informative representation of the incident that can be considered as evidence. 
 
C. Operational challenges:  
 
 The apparent culture gap between Information Technology (IT) specialists and Operations 
personnel: At first sight, such division appears to be created by the differences in operational 
objectives between the industrial control community (availability, reliability, safety) and the 
traditional IT security focus (confidentiality, integrity, availability). 
 
 The absence of dedicated scientific studies: There is lack of dedicated scientific studies on 
the performance of typical control and instrumentation equipment operating under security 
configurations of tight access control, strong encryption and comprehensive event logging. 
The end-user community appears rather conservative upon adopting security architectures 
that are built on these premises. 
 
 Management of obsolescence and the availability of skills to handle legacy systems: 
Currently the user community identifies a significant skills shortage in this area, with key 
people retiring and the new generation of engineers not readily possessing the skills to work 
on older systems. 
 
 The fundamentally different lifecycles of the infrastructures: Components of a traditional IT 
infrastructure would have a limited lifecycle in comparison to the SCADA instrumentation 
and control equipment (typically 5-7 years versus perceivably a few decades 
correspondingly). 
5 Recommendations  
ENISA has identified the following key areas where action can be taken in order to develop 
investigative capabilities that match the level of perceived risk: 
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A. Facilitate integration with existing structures for reporting and analysis: 
a. Understand where evidence may be found: As part of the traditional risk assessment 
process, it may be beneficial to consider along with the scenarios of security breaches where 
evidence is crucial and to identify where this evidence could be found. 
b. Understand the impact of data retention: It is recommended that some form of impact 
assessment of data retention policies is performed on a test infrastructure that resembles 
the operating environment. It is essential to develop an understanding of whether any 
overhead is introduced (and how much if so), when enabling more advanced logging 
features over and above the traditional fault recording and performance-tracking paradigm 
of operation. 
c. Manage obsolescence and the IT/Ops interface: Albeit not directly related to ex post 
analysis, a structured plan for obsolescence management, where applicable, will ensure that 
adequate knowledge of legacy systems exists and that access to the appropriate facilities for 
their management is possible. 
B. Safeguard systems and configurations: 
a. Deploy adequate security controls that also perform logging – such as firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems: The cornerstone of effective security management is the implementation 
of appropriate and well-measured controls able to balance the risk and provide mechanisms 
to counter and follow up incidents. 
b. Design systems with evidence protection in mind: Adequate protection of data historians is 
essential for forensic-grade evidence retention. Contemporary systems may be able to log a 
variety of events but if the access to the logs is compromised an attacker could easily erase 
their tracks. 
c. Enable logging of common events across the system as a minimum: Most contemporary 
control systems and equipment at device level are capable of producing and retaining a 
wealth of information related to their operational status and also to contextual events. 
However what events can be logged and the exact form of the data may vary tremendously 
from one equipment vendor to another. 
C. Review key roles and responsibilities: 
a. Identify gaps in digital investigation skills: It is important to understand the available level of 
(or the lack of) skill and knowledge of investigative expertise among existing staff. 
b. Identify physical and cyber response interfaces and overlaps: A review of organisational roles 
and responsibilities involved in incident response, including operational, physical security 
and cyber incidents, may facilitate the integration of the responding capability from both 
physical and cyber perspective. 
D. Pursue inter-organisational public and privately held and cross country cooperation: 
a. A coordinated approach at cross-country level (e.g. pan European): This could be another 
dimension that could promote further community development. 
b. Experience sharing and multi-party private and public collaboration may enhance the 
chances of delivering a solution that is comprehensive and applies more generally: Enabling 
inter-state collaboration is perceivably critical, as attacks may be targeted across a number of 
sites, from a number of foreign jurisdictions. 
